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MARY RIDDEL* & R. KEITH SCHWER**

Grand Canyon Visitors: The
Challenges of Regulatory Schemes
for Balancing Alternative Interests
ABSTRACT
The failure of the price system when faced with public goods and
externalitiesis citedas the rationaleforgovernment interventionin
the market. When government agencies step in to guide market
forces, however, they may also fail, resulting in more resources
being expended than necessary to achieve the desired outcome.
Implied social losses from inefficient regulation have led many
policy analysts to question the desirabilityof command and control
approachesand suggest a move toward incentive-based strategies
for environmental regulation.In this article,we suggest targeting
initial regulatory reform to situations in which environmental
externalities are reversible. Using a case study of the Federal
Aviation Agency's recent rulemaking surroundingcommercialair
tour limitations in the Grand Canyon NationalPark (GCNP), we
providean example ofgovernmentfailureresultingfrom command
and control approaches to environmental regulation. We make a
clear case that the costs of the proposed regulationoutweigh the
benefits to ground visitors to the GCNP. We suggest two dierent
incentive-basedstrategiesthatcould provide the same level of noise
reductionachieved by the proposedquota system. Finally,we argue
that becauseof the non-cumulativenature of noiseexternalities, the
GCNP is an ideal setting in which to test the efficacy of incentivebased strategiesfor environmentalcontrol.
1. INTRODUCTION
Under basic tenets of economic theory, competitive free markets
will efficiently allocate scarce goods amongst consumers.' As such,
efficiency occurs when the rate of tradeoff between any two goods is the
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1. A free market equilibrium will be socially optimal if the distribution of goods
optimizes social welfare.
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same for all economic agents.2 When markets exist, prices provide the rate
of trade-off between the two goods? This result fails, however, when faced
with non-market goods such as clean air or water because markets and
prices don't exist for these goods. For an efficient allocation of non-market
goods to occur, extra-market forces must step in and allocate goods based
on implicit prices, such as willingness to pay estimates.4 The failure of the
price system under these conditions is cited as the rationale for government
intervention in the market.5
The intercession of an extra-market force into situations where
market failure is present is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a
socially efficient allocation of public and private goods. Indeed, when
government agencies step in to guide market forces, they may also fail,
resulting in more resources being expended than necessary to achieve the
desired outcome.' In some cases, a net efficiency loss may be observed
because political concerns override economic efficiency. In other cases, legal
directives may ignore the tradeoffs inherent in allocating economic goods!
More often than not, government regulation takes the form of a socially
inefficient quota whereby environmental damages are mandated to not
exceed some given level
Command and control approaches to regulation, such as quotas
and standards, have long been recognized by economists to frequently
result in inefficient allocation of non-market goods! The inefficiency arises
from two sources. First, once the standard is met, there is no incentive for
regulated agents to further reduce damages. Second, the standards may
require costly improvements that add little benefit to society.0 In this case,
the costs of the regulation exceed benefits and the final result is a net social
loss.

2.

See WALTERNIatOLsON, MJCXOECONOMCETmORY: BASIC PUNcnzLES AND ExTESIONS

222, 512 (5th ed. 1992).
3.

Seeid.at233,512.

4. See id. at 745,751.
5. See BARRYC. FIEL, ENVIRONMErAL ECONOMICS: AN U=

C'n0N68 (2d ed. 1997);

WILUAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E.OATS, THE THEORY OF ENvROrNMENTAL POLICY 1-7 (1988).
6. See CHARLES WoLF, JR., MARKM OR GOVERNMENTS: CHOOSING BEnVEEN IMPERFECT

ALTERNATIVES 35 (Rand Corp. PubI'n Series No. N-2505-SF, 1988).
7.

See id. at 34-36.

8. See Kenneth J.Arrow et al.,
Is There a Role for Cost-Benefit Analysis inEnvironmental,
Health,and Safty Regulation?, 272 SCENE 221 (1996).
9. For a discussion of the inefficiency of standards in dealing with environmental
externalities see ALLEN V. KNEES! & CHARLES L ScHuLr, POW.TION, PRICES, AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1975); FI'D, supranote 5, at 211-24; WOLF, supra note 6, at 57-63; Richard B. Stewart,
Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 153, 153

(1988).
10. See KNEES! & SCHULTZ!, supra note 9.
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As a result of criticism from the private and academic sectors
concerning the inefficiency ofmany environmental regulations, cost-benefit
analysis has begun to play a tentative role in environmental policy decision
making. Executive orders by Presidents Reagan 1 and Clinton12 instruct the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to perform cost-benefit analysis
when devising environmental regulation. However, using cost-benefit
analysis in developing environmental regulation is not the accepted norm
for federal agencies. According to the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980,
regulatory agencies are required to prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis
(RFA) unless "the head of the agency certifies that the rule will not, if
promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number
of small entities." 3 The Regulatory Flexibility Act also requires that
regulatory agencies "endeavor, consistent with the objective of the rule and
of applicable statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to
the scale of the business, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions
subject to regulation." Thus, this directive requires regulatory agencies to
consider flexible regulatory proposals and explain the rationale for their
actions, though there is no mandate that the agencies use economic
rationale to support their decisions.
Because agencies are not required to show that society as a whole
is economically better off under proposed regulations than without them,
the possibility exists that regulations may be enacted that lead to suboptimal social improvements or even actual social losses. One study
estimates that federal regulations targeted at improving public health,
safety, and the environment cost $200 billion annually.' s Yet another study
points out that many current environmental and health regulations could
not pass a cost-benefit test.' For example, Arrow et al. point out that the
EPA, when assessing the efficiency of environmental regulations, uses
values for a human statistical life ranging between $200,000 and $6.3
trillion.1 One finds it hard to believe that such differences reflect careful
analysis. Thus, the coupling of high regulatory costs with unreliable
estimates of benefits creates a strong case for questioning the ability of the
public sector to correct market failure under current regulatory conditions.

11.

See Exec. OrderNo. 12,291,3C.F.R. 127 (1982), reuokedby Exec. Order No. 12,866§ 11,

3 C.F.R 638 (1994).
12.
13.

See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 11, 3 C.F.R 638 (1994).
5 U.S.C. § 605 (1994 & Supp. I 1997).

14.
15.
16.
17.

5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
See Arrow et aL, supra note 8.
See id.
See id.
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Command and Control Approaches versus Incentive-Based Strategies
Implied social losses from inefficient regulation have led many
policy analysts to question the desirability of command and control
approaches and suggest a move toward incentive-based strategies for
environmental regulation." Under an incentive-based approach, benefits
and costs of a regulation are compared in order to choose between
competing regulations. Further, the market is allowed to work, within
certain defined parameters, through transferable permits or charges on
emissions fees. Supporters of incentive-based strategies point out that when
market-based solutions are used, a "socially efficient" level of the
externality is achieved at the lowest possible cost to society. 19
The argument that incentive-based strategies for pollution control
provide more "bang for the buck" has provided momentum for a
movement to incentive-based systems. Some authors suggest that an
incremental shift away from command and control toward a fee and
permit-based approach be instituted. Ackerman and Stewart recommend
beginning with marketable air and water pollution rights at the national
level, then later allowing for regional differences in emissions. Mintz
suggests a more cautious approach using "a carefully limited system of
transferable pollution permits, based upon existing regulatory standards."2 '
In this article, we argue that a third direction for change is
apparent-targeting initial regulatory reform to a situation in which
environmental externalities are reversible. Using a case study of the Federal
Aviation Agency's (FAA) recent rulemaking surrounding commercial air
tour limitations in the Grand Canyon National Park (GCNP), we provide
an example of governmental failure resulting from command and control
approaches to environmental regulation. We show that the current
regulatory environment supported an incomplete analysis of the costs and
benefits of regulating the air tour industry in the GCNP. Further, we make
a clear case that the costs of the proposed regulation outweigh the benefits
to ground visitors to the GCNP. We suggest two different incentive-based

18. See FIMeD, supra note 5, at 230.
19.

The "socially effident" level of an externality is reached when the marginal benefit of

reducing the externality is equal to the marginal cost of doing so. For several excellent
references concerning this topic, see THOMAS H. TWm1ENRG, EMSSONS TRADING, AN EXRcIE
IN REFORMING POLLUTION PoucY (1985).
20. Bruce A.Ackerman &Richard B. Stewart, Reforming EnvironmentalLaw: The Democratic
Casefor Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. EA7L L 171,191-94 (1988).
21. Joel A. Mintz, Economic Reform ofEnvironmentalProtection:A Brief Comment on a Recent
Debate, 15 HARV. ENv. L REv. 149, 162 (1991). See also Howard Latin, Ideal versus Real
Regulatory Efficiency: Implementationof Uniform Standardsand "Fine-tuning"Regulatory Reform,
37 STAN. L RE'. 1267 (1985).
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strategies that could provide the same level of noise reduction achieved by
the proposed quota system. Finally, we argue that the case study of aircraft
noise externalities in the GCNP is particularly compelling because several
incentive-based solutions exist for controlling aircraft noise. In fact, because
of the non-cumulative nature of noise externalities, the GCNP is an ideal
setting in which to test the efficacy of incentive-based strategies for
environmental control.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE PROPOSED REGULATION
The National Park System (NPS), a part of the Department of the
Interior (DOI), currently manages a total of 378 areas. ' Their mission is to
preserve "unimpaired the natural and cultural resources and values of the
national park system for the enjoyment, education, and inspiration of this
and future generations."' These are resources whose preservation,
management, and use are likely to offer social values that exceed market
values that could be gained from their development. The social values are
derived from the aesthetic, recreation, ecosystem, and existence values that
are impossible to purchase in a private market.
In response to growing concern about the "significant adverse effect
of aircraft on the natural quiet and experience of the [GCNP]," Congress
enacted Public Law 100-91, popularly called the "Overflights Act."2 The act
mandated that the NPS and the FAA devise regulations that would provide
a "substantial restoration of natural quiet" to the GCNP.' In May 1988, in
response to Public Law 100-91, the FAA created a Special Flight Rules Area
(SFRA) over the GCNP, prohibiting flights below 14,499 feet above mean
sea level.' Accompanying the new SFRA was regulation SFAR (Special
Flight Area Rule) No. 50-2, establishing special routes for air tours, curfews,
communications requirements, and creating several flight-free zones.2"
In 1994, the DOI submitted a final report entitled "Report to
Congress on Effects of Aircraft Overflights on the National Park System,"

22. See The National Parks System: Caring for the American Legacy (last modified Oct. 26,
1999) <http://www.nps.gov/legacy/mission.html>.
23. Id.
24. Grand Canyon Overflights Act, Pub. L No. 100-91 § 3,101 Stat. 674,676-77 (codified
at 16 U.S.C. § la (note) (1994)).
25. Id.
26. Special Flight Rules in the Vicinity of the Grand Canyon Nation Park, 53 Fed. Reg.
20,264 (proposed June 2,1988) (to be codified at 14 C.FR. pts. 91 & 135).
27. See id.
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containing recommendations for revising the regulations.' This report
recommended simplifying the structure of commercial sightseeing routes,
expanding flight-free zones and time periods, phasing in of quiet
technology aircraft, and establishing a system to monitor aviation-related
noise in the GCNP.2 In 1996, the FAA issued the final rule instituting many
of the recommendations.")The rule also contained a ceiling on the number
of sightseeing overflights that would be allowed at GCNP. The effective
date for
full implementation of the final rule has been delayed several
31
times.

Currently, flight routes and curfews are in force. The full rule,
including the ceiling on overflights, was scheduled to be implemented in
January 2000.1 However, testimony introduced into public hearings held
by the FAA in Flagstaff, Arizona, and Las Vegas, Nevada, in August 1999
raised concerns about the impact of the rules on small businesses and the
credibility of the cost-benefit analysis attached to the rulemaking.' As a
result, the FAA is reviewing the proposed regulation, and implementation
has been delayed further. As of January 2001, no new date had been set for
implementation.
III. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE NOISE MANAGEMENT
REGULATIONS
Do the proposed noise management regulations for the GCNP
move us any closer to the socially efficient outcome? This article argues that
they do not. In fact, under the proposed regulations, uncertain benefits to
ground users are given priority over certain and tangible benefits to air tour
consumers. The outcome of the proposed regulations will be an unequal
shift of benefits from air tour consumers and operators to users on the
ground resulting in a net loss of benefits from GCNP resources.
As overflights are limited, benefits to users of GCNP resources on
the ground rise to the extent that the visitor experience improves with the
quieter environment. However, limiting overflights below the market
28. See, e.g., Commercial Air Tour Limitation in the Grand Canyon National Park Special
Flight Rules Area, 64 Fed. Reg. 37,304 (July 9, 1999) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 93)

(describing the history of the FAA's actions).
29. See id.
30. Special Flight Rules in the Vicinity of the Grand Canyon Nation Park, 61 Fed. Reg.
69,302 (Dec. 31, 1996) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 91,93,121, and 135).
31. Commercial Air Tour Limitation in the Grand Canyon National Park Special Flight
Rules Area, 64 Fed. Reg. at 37,304.
32. See 14 C.F.R. pt. 93, subpart U (2000).

33. Seeld.
34. Testimony ofXR Keith Schwer, Center for Business and Economic Research, University
of Nevada, Las Vegas.
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equilibrium will cause the price of scenic air tours to rise and lead to a
reduction in benefits to individuals that consume the aesthetic resources of
the park from the air. Though prices rise, leading to an increase in revenues
per flight for operators, quotas restrict air-tour operators from collecting the
revenues from all flights demanded by consumers, leading to additional
social losses.'
Economic efficiency instructs us to equalize the marginal benefits
to each user group using the GCNP.3 As such, some noise would be
tolerated because it results in benefits to air tour consumers. On the other
hand, a socially efficient outcome is likely to entail some restrictions on
overflights because excess aircraft noise is perceived as detracting from the
wilderness experience for some visitors. Essentially, social efficiency
requires balancing the benefits to each visitor group by reducing benefits
to some groups and increasing benefits to others so that the overall benefit
is maximizedY' In order to decide what the socially optimal level of noise
should be, regulators need a clear idea about the benefits of the proposed
regulation to ground users and the costs to air tour consumers and
operators.
The RFA' reports estimates of the benefits of the proposed
regulation to ground users of the GCNP. Benefits to individual park users
are estimated using a standard economic measure of "consumer surplus,"
defined as the difference between what a person is willing to pay for a good
and what is actually paid for the good." Total benefits are calculated using
what the report terms "the benefit transfer approach," whereby data from
similar sites are used to estimate consumer surplus in lieu of collecting sitespecific data. ® In the RFA, benefits are estimated for three groups: riverusers, backpackers, and others, including sightseers, hikers, and campers.
Visitor days for each group during 1997 are 99,137,182,481 and 5,788,187,
respectively, giving total visitation during that year of 6,069,805. 41
Calculation of the total economic benefit of the regulation in the
RFA, in terms of consumer surplus, proceeds in several steps.

35. For a discussion of quotas, see FIELD, supra note 5, at 218-21.
36.
37.

See Nicholson, supranote 2, at 222-23, 512.
See id.

38. See OFFICE OF AVIATION Poucy & PLANS, U.S. DEP'TOFTRANSP., INITIAL REGuLATORY
EVALUATION, INITIAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILIXY ANALYSI, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IMPACT
ASSESSMENT, AND UN-FUNDED MANDATES ASSESSMENT: NOTICE OF PROPOSED
RULMAIN-COMMERCIAL AIR TOUR LIMITATION IN THE GRAND CANYON NATIONAL PARW

SPECIAL FLIGHT RULES AREA (1999).
39. See A. MYicx FREEMAN II, THE MEASU~maN OF ENVRONMENTAL AND RESOURcE
VALUES: THEORY AND MmHODs 46 (1993).
40.

See OPIICEOF AVIATION POLICY & PLANS, supra note 38, at 41-53.

41.

See id. at 44.
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(1)Using three different external willingness-to-pay studies,
visitor-day values are multiplied by total visitation in each
category and total annual willingness-to-pay for recreation in
the Park, without the regulation, is calculated 42 The marginal
willingness-to-pay for the "other" category is derived from a
study done for Bryce Canyon National Park.' The economic
value of visitation for backpackers is taken from a national
study of outdoor recreation.' The value for river users is
taken from a study actually done for the GCNP.0
(2) Using these external studies, which provide qualitative
information concerning recreationists' exposure to aircraft
noise in the GCNP, varying levels of benefit reduction are
applied to each category of visitor depending on their
exposure to aircraft noise." Due to the lack of information
concerning actual reductions in willingness to pay for
recreation in the GCNP, benefit reduction is chosen arbitrarily
as follows: 20 percent for those slightly impacted, 40 percent
for those moderately impacted, 60 percent for those impacted
very much, and 80 percent for those extremely impacted. A
sensitivity analysis is reported that uses one-half of the
benefit-reduction levels. The estimated total lost consumer
surplus from aircraft noise for 1997 using the full-benefit
reduction is $34,453,000.' 7
Next, a linearized noise index is calculated for the base year.'
Expected noise measures are calculated given that no action is taken to limit
aircraft in the GCNP. For a given year, the percentage change from noise
levels in the base year is applied to the lost consumer surplus. For example,
the base-year linearized noise index is estimated to be 1219.23, with a noise
index of 1577.47 in year 2000." This is a change of 22.71 percent in noise
levels, so undiscounted costs are reduced by $34.453 * .2271 = $7.82 million,
the benefits attributable to the regulation in that year. Using the above

42. The FAA uses willingness-to-pay values for the three recreation categories from the
following articles: John C. Bergstrom & H. Ken Cordell, An Analysis of the Demandfor and Value
of Outdoor Recreationin the United States, 23 J.LiMSURE RES., 67, 67-68 (1991); Abraham E. Haspel
& F. Reed Johnson,multiple DestinationTrip Bias in Recreation Benefit Estimation,58 LANDECON.,
364, 364 (1982); BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEF'T OF THE IWEIoR OPERATION OF GLEN
CANYON DAM: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 164-66 (1995).

43. See Haspel & Johnson, supra note 42.
44. See Bergstrom & Cordell, supranote 42.
45. See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, supra note 42.
46.

See OFFICE OF AVIATION POUCY & PLANS, supra note 38, at 41-53.

47. See id. at 48.
48. See id. at 49.
49. See id.
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methodology, the report concludes that the total present value of benefits
to ground users, including backpackers, river users, and sightseers, over the
ten-year evaluation period is $34.61 million, allowing for a discount rate of
seven percent.50
Unfortunately, the estimates of the economic benefits of the
regulation to ground users are subject to a high degree of error due to the
valuation technique used and the damage relationship underlying the
benefit model. The "benefits transfer method" of valuing a non-market
good is subject to large amounts of error because the good in question
deviates from those used in the related studies. The amount an individual
is willing to pay for backpacking, for instance, may be different in the
GCNP than in Bryce Canyon National Park. Because willingness-to-pay acts
as an estimate of the recreational experience in benefit estimation, using an
ambiguous number introduces excessive uncertainty into the final grounduser benefit estimate.
Four valuation techniques are currently recognized as "state of the
art" for estimating the economic value of non-market goods.51 These are
contingent valuation, hedonic studies, travel cost studies, and metaanalysis. Of these four, meta-analysis most closely approximates the
benefits transfer method. With meta-analysis, the value of a non-market
good is estimated using a set of past studies that value similar goods. For
example, to value the recreation experience in the GCNP, we may combine
estimates of the recreation value of other sites across the nation, and use
these as a proxy for GCNP recreation value. A set of studies is used because
the estimate, essentially an average of the values contained in the previous
studies, is more precise than if only one study is used. Generally speaking,
the precision increases as more studies are used.
Ironically, the meta-analysis approach has come under heavy fire
from both economists and statisticians. Critics claim that the results are
subject to large amounts of error due to small sample sizes and publication
bias.' The benefits transfer method then, with only one sample point, can
be seen as the worst case of a highly suspect methodology. Thus, the use of
a highly criticized approach further underscores the uncertainty of the FAA
estimates of benefits from the proposed regulation.
Another problem in the estimate of the benefit of the regulation to
ground users arises from the assumptions made concerning the damages
that ground users suffer from aircraft noise. The study reports the
50. See id. at 52.
51. See FREEMAN MJ,
supranote 39, at 486-88.
52. See generally Colin B. Begg & Jesse A. Berlin, PublicationBias: A Problem in Interpreting
Medical Data, 151 J.
ROYAL STAT. SoC'Y 419 (1988); Frederick Mosteller &Thomas C. Chalmers,
Some Progress and Problems in Meta-Analysis of Clinical Trials (in Meta-Analysis: Methods for
CombiningIndependent Studies), 7 STAT. Sci. 227 (1992).
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percentage of visitors by category that are impacted either "not at all,"
"slightly," "moderately," "very much," or "extremely." Ordinal
categorizations such as these are not useful for valuing the impact of the
noise. A simple example illustrates this point. One person may respond that
they were only slightly affected by the noise, but if questioned further, may
express a willingness-to-pay of $20 for the experience without noise.
Another individual, experiencing the same level of noise, maybe disturbed
"extremely," but only willing to pay $5 for relief. As illustrated, the
estimated damages are entirely determined by the values chosen by the
report's authors for the benefit reductions assigned to each of the impact
categories. In short, the estimated benefits of the regulation rest on
arbitrarily assigned values.
To illustrate the uncertainty that arises from these assumptions,
let's assume instead that the visitor-day value for those affected slightly is
reduced by one percent, those affected moderately by three percent, those
affected very much by eight percent, and those affected extremely by ten
percent. Then the reduction in consumer surplus attributable to aircraft
noise in 1997 is reduced by almost ten times from $34.6 million to $3.6
million. Unfortunately, no empirical evidence offers guidance in choosing
between these two estimates of $34.6 million and $3.6 million.
Further problems exist in the study concerning the benefits to
GCNP visitors from reducing aircraft noise. The calculations assume that
the percentage reductionin noise results in a one-to-one percentage increase
in benefits to the affected parties. Empirically, there is no reason to believe
this. Indeed, economic theory posits the concept of diminishing marginal
benefit, that is, additional units of a good provide less and less satisfaction
for the individual.' Typically, environmental damages are very low or zero
at low levels of an externality due to the environment's assimilative
capacity.s Thus, as the level of damage, noise in this case, increases,
economic costs increase to reflect higher damages from each additional
decibel. Thus, reducing the first unit of noise will have the greatest benefit
to the individual, and the added benefit from eliminating each consecutive
unit of noise will be smaller.
As before, we change the assumptions of the model and recalculate
the benefits assuming that the first six percent of noise reduction increases
benefits by ten percent, the next 6.4 percent of noise reduction increases
benefits by eight percent, the next 6.8 percent of noise reduction is paired
with a benefit increase of five percent, and the final seven percent of noise
reduction increases benefits by one percent. Using these illustrative
assumptions, year 2000 benefits fall from $7.82 million in the FAA model to

53.
54.

See NIcOOSON, supra note 2, at 88-90.
See FID, supra note 5, at 84-7,95.

Winter 20011

BALANCING ALTERNATIVE INTERESTS

$3.7 million in our model. Again, we find large variations in program
benefits resulting from changes in model assumptions.
The benefits transfer method and the choice of the damage function
together lead to a high degree of uncertainty surrounding the FAA
estimates of benefits to ground users from the proposed regulation. In fact,
using the data currently available, the benefit of the regulation to ground
users of the GCNP cannot be estimated with any acceptable degree of
certainty.
Economic Efficiency: Societal Gain versus Societal Loss under the Present
Regulatory Scheme
For an economically efficient outcome to occur, the benefits to
ground users from the regulation must be weighed against the lost benefits
to air tour consumers from restricted flights and higher prices. 5' As demand
for flights increases, the airlines will be able to raise prices to recoup the lost
revenues associated with fewer flights. For each dollar increase in the flight
cost, each passenger loses a dollar in consumer surplus.' Additional
consumer surplus is lost from flights that are demanded, but-cannot be
flown due to quotas."
To estimate the lost consumer surplus from the regulation, we must
construct a demand curve for GCNP air tours. Estimates of the elasticity of
demand for leisure travel indicate that the value is elastic, with an
approximate value of two. ' Using a constant elasticity of demand estimate
of two and an illustrative flight cost of $100, consumer surplus losses to air
tour customers exceed $25.8 million for the ten years investigated in the
report if the industry were to have grown at 3.3 percent per year absent the
regulation.", "' The present value of this benefit, over the ten-year evaluation period, is approximately $9.9 million."'

55. See id.
56. See FREEMAN HI, supra note 39, at 50-52.
57. See FIEw, supra note 5, at 218-21.
58. Previous studies have estimated the elasticity of demand for leisure travel at
approximately 2. See STEPHEN SHAW, ARLINE MARKEING ANDMANAGEMENT66 (2d ed. 1988).
59. If the elasticity of demand is 2, then a I percent increase in the price of flights will be
followed by a 2 percent drop in demand for flights.

60. The estimated industry growth rate of 3.3 percent is taken from the RFA. See OmIC
OF AVIATION Poucy & PLANS, supranote 38, at 58.
61. It is important to note that the estimated $9.9 million loss in consumer surplus to air
tour customers is a lower limit One could argue that further losses in consumer surplus result
from increasing the minimum flight altitudes and thereby compromising the sightseeing
experience. While this is probably true, the extent of the losses may not be determined without
further study.
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The air tour consumers lose value due to the higher prices resulting
from the restrictions on flights. The air tour companies also lose future
revenues from flights that cannot be sold. The FAA estimates that the
companies stand to lose $114.6 million (discounted) over the ten-year
period of the cost-benefit evaluation assuming a 3.3 percent growth rate.'
These are monies that are not captured by any other economic agent.
Further costs are incurred due to administrative requirements of the
regulation. The RFA reports that the discounted cost of monitoring
compliance for the FAA is estimated to be $1million. 3 Administrative costs
for the airlines are projected to be $23,000, discounted." Therefore, the
estimated total economic losses over the ten years studied from the
regulation, including lost consumer surplus, lost revenues, and compliance
cost, exceed $125 million, assuming a discount rate of seven percent.
The $125 million estimated cost to air tour customers, airlines, and
the FAA may be justified from an economic efficiency standpoint if, in fact,
the gain to ground users exceeds the loss. Comparing the costs of the
program to the estimated benefit to ground users of $34.7 million we see
that, from an efficiency perspective, the regulation should not be instituted.
In essence, the regulation may be viewed as a transfer of consumer surplus
revenues from the air tour market to the ground visitors of the GCNP.
Further, when one considers the high degree of uncertainty that
surrounds the FAA estimate of benefits to ground users of the GCNP, then
the regulation entails even larger economic losses to society. Depending on
the alternative assumptions that we propose, which are more consistent
with economic theory than the FAA's estimates, benefits to ground visitors
may be less than one-tenth of the FAA estimate. In essence, society would
be paying $125 million to receive $3.6 million in benefits.
IV. QUOTAS AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
The large economic losses resulting from the regulation follow from
the statutory requirement for noise reduction. Public Law 100-91 mandates
a "substantial restoration of the natural quiet" and does not direct the NPS
or the FAA to balance benefits and costs to different user groups of the
GCNP.63 What the economic analysis tells us is that the standard requiring
"substantial restoration of quiet" is not socially beneficial. This is not to say
that some reduction in aircraft noise is not necessary to reach a socially

62.

See OFFICE OFAVIATION POLICY & PLANS, supra note 38, at 58.

63. See id. at 54.
64. See id.
65. Grand CanyonOverflights Act, Pub. L. No. 100-91 §3(b)(1), 101 Stat. 674,676 (codified
at 16 U.S.C. § la (note) (1994)).
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efficient outcome. Rather, the claim is made that the reduction mandated
by the statute restricts noise too much because it ignores the inherent tradeoffs that exist in constraining the use of National Park resources. Using
quotas to allocate non-market goods usually results in a socially inefficient
allocation of natural resources, especially with the passage of time and
changes in demand and supply conditions because, once the noise quota is
reached, no more noise reduction will take place."
V. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND INCENTIVE-BASED
RULEMAKING
A large body of literature supports the use of incentive-based
strategies for managing environmental externalities rather than command
and control approaches. 7 One example of incentive-based strategies
includes imposing fees on units of noise emitted based on the type of
aircraft flown. Another potential incentive-based strategy would be to allow
air-tour operators a "noise budget."' The operator would be allocated a
noise budget and allowed to fly as many flights as they chose as long as the
budget was not exceeded.
The primary benefit of these economic-based reforms is that, under
most situations, they encourage continued investment in environmental
technology as emitters seek to minimize their costs of compliance.69
Incentive-based strategies force producers to consider the damage inflicted
on others, including the environment, in their production decisions because
they impose costs for each level of pollutant, in our case noise, emitted. In
the fee-based system, each unit of noise carries a fee. As fees raise the costs
of operating noisy aircraft, prices rise and the equilibrium number of flights
will fall.' In the "noise budget" approach, the cost of flying noisy aircraft
is the reduction of the number of flights that can be flown in quiet aircraft.
For instance, if Aircraft A is twice as quiet as Aircraft B, twice as many
flights may be flown in A as B. Choosing to employ aircraft B means losing
the additional revenue from flights flown in A. Thus, a socially preferred
option (in terms of maximizing social welfare) is one that encourages air-

66.
67.

See Arrow et al., supra note 8, at 222.
See FREDmcK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONmENTAL ImpROVEAMENTTHROUGH

ECONOMIC INCoNTIVms (1977). Also, for a comprehensive list of citations concerning the social
optimality of incentive-based strategies see Mintz, supra note 21, at 151-64.
68. The concept of a noise budget as a means of improving the efficiency of noise control
in the Grand Canyon was proposed by Gary Becker at the Federal Aviation Administration,

Office of Aviation Policy and Plans, Operations Regulatory Analysis Branc, APO-310 at the
Western Economics Association Annual Meeting in Vancouver, B.C., on July 2,2000.
69.

See FED, supra note 5, at 230-33.

70. See id.
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tour operators to switch to quiet technology aircraft. If quieter aircraft were
used, then the number of overflights for a given level of noise damage could
increase, while still allowing for benefits to ground users.
One may question a fee-based or "noise budget" approach to noise
regulation and suggest that any new regulation specify the types of aircraft
that may be flown, thus avoiding the use of noisier aircraft. The difficulty
with moving to a standard of "quiet aircraft" is that it is still a command
and control approach, albeit a rather more thoughtful one than flight
quotas. The problem here is that once the technology standard is met, there
is no incentive to further reduce aircraft noise." As the number of flights
increases with the projected increase in demand for air tours, aircraft noise
might re-emerge as a problem unless regulators encourage the industry to
"set the bar higher" by using increasingly quieter aircraft. It is conceivable
that, eventually, an extremely quiet aircraft could be designed that would
largely eliminate the problem of aircraft noise in the GCNP altogether.
A more efficient approach to flight quotas or a technology standard
would be to enact a fee schedule for noise generation over the GCNP for
commercial and general aviation flights.' A fee program would require
operators to register aircraft and report the number of flight hours, over
some specified time period, to the FAA. Fees would be based on the noise
reduction technology on the aircraft and the number of flight hours over the
Canyon. This raises the cost of flying noisier planes and forces air-tour
operators to consider the social cost of aircraft noise when deciding which
planes to operate.
Fees will automatically cause prices to rise, making flights more
expensive. As the price rises, demand falls and the number of flights flown
falls. Assuming an elasticity of demand of two, indicating that a one percent
increase in the price of flights will be followed by a two percent drop in
demand, fees would move the market toward a socially efficient
equilibrium immediately. Further, fees have an additional impact on new
investment in the air-tour industry. Because noisy planes would be
effectively more expensive, a move toward quiet aircraft would naturally
result. Early adopters would be able to lower prices and capture market
share.73 Recognizing this, operators would make the shift to quiet aircraft
quickly to avoid losing market share. 4

71.

See i. at 221.

72. See id. at 230-33.
73. See id. There is also a benefit to air-tour customers from reduced aircraft noise which
will tend to draw consumers away from the noisier aircraft.
74. Inanticipation of noise-based regulation, several operators have already invested in
quieter aircraft. Interview with Jim Petty, President, Grand Canyon Air-Tour Council, in Las
Vegas, Nev. (July, 1999).
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The noise budget approach would have a similar impact on the
investment choices as a fee program, and would immediately limit the
number of flights flown. Noise budgets would act as a noise quota, allowing
operators to fly as many flights as they choose, so long as their noise
allocation is not exceeded. Operators would have to switch to quieter
aircraft to increase the number of flights and, therefore, revenues. In this
way, the industry is regulated, but is allowed to expand if it does not
impose additional costs on society in the form of aircraft noise.
VI. CONFLICTING LAWS AND EFFICIENT ALLOCATION
Given the variety of incentive-based alternatives to controlling
noise in the GCNP, we must question why so many resources have been
devoted to devising a regulation where, by the FAA's own estimates, costs
of the regulation clearly exceed the benefits. We posit that the answer is the
institutional framework in which the regulations are made. Though the
Regulatory Flexibility Act requires cost-benefit analysis to be performed, it
does not convey strict scientific standards for the analysis, nor does it
require regulators to abide by the implications with respect to social
efficiency.' If cost-benefit analysis is performed only to fulfill mandates
rather than to assess the ranking of different regulatory schemes, then costconscious agencies are given an incentive to perform incomplete analyses.
Many have argued that calculating the benefits and costs of
environmental regulations is difficult, if not impossible. 6 They reason that
cost-benefit analysis often does not include the costs of devising and
implementing incentive-based strategies. Further, they argue that with the
typically high uncertainty concerning environmental damages, socially
efficient outcomes are unlikely and may often lead to net social harm.
Finally, they argue correctly that incentive-based strategies often lead to
more environmental damage than command and control approaches to
regulation.77
While criticisms of incentive-based approaches have some merit in
certain contexts, it may be argued that reducing noise in the GCNP is an
excellent place to begin investigating the potential of incentive-based
strategies. Because noise is a non-cumulative externality, time-related
uncertainty concerning noise damages does not complicate cost-benefit
analyses. Though implementation and enforcement costs for either a
technology or fee-based approach will be considerable, there is no reason

,aSON Er AL., supra note 67, at 35-37,148,155.
75. See A
76. See Mintz, supra note 21; Latin, supra note 21.
77. This is a reasonable assertion because incentive strategies typically tolerate some
.socially efficient level of damage." See Fjjw, supranote 5, at 95.
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to believe that they would be any lower than implementing and enforcing
a quota system. Finally, transferring visitors from the ground to the air in
the GCNP will help mitigate some cumulative environmental degradation
and actually reduce the uncertainty surrounding management of GCNP
resources.
Because of the non-cumulative impact of noise on GCNP resources,
we are faced with an ideal setting in which to test incentive-based strategies
for controlling externalities. Others have suggested an incremental move
toward incentive-based regulation.78 We suggest the place to start this
reform is in situations where uncertainty surrounding benefits and costs are
low and environmental damage is non-cumulative and reversible. Clearly,
aircraft noise does not cause permanent damage to GCNP resources,
making it an ideal environment in which to test incentive-based regulatory
strategies.
Using "trial runs" for testing the efficacy of incentive-based
mechanisms for environmental protection was suggested by Mintz (1991),
though he did not provide any details concerning regulations to target. 9 We
suggest that collecting information concerning market-based strategies
through reversible regulations with transitory environmental impacts can
give needed insight into the regulatory costs, efficacy, and implementation
pitfalls that may be encountered in a movement toward permits and fees for
controlling environmental externalities. The data would provide
information about how producers change emissions levels, prices, quality,
and quantity of goods when faced with environmental fees. Because airtour operators will alter their mix of aircraft in order to minimize costs
when faced with fees, the data will also provide a case study of fleet-mix
response to regulation.
Information gleaned from fee-based regulation in the GCNP would
be helpful in devising efficient environmental regulations for other
industries that are associated with either cumulative or non-cumulative
emissions. In essence, data concerning producer response to environmental
regulation may be gathered under low-risk circumstances where
environmental costs are transitory and the knowledge gained may be
applied to situations where impacts are perhaps more permanent. For
example, producer response data could also be useful in devising fee-based
regulation for improving air quality from corporate vehicle fleet emissions.
And because technology investment enables firms to avoid fees, the data
would also be useful in cases where incentives for environmental
technological investment is called for, such as controlling emissions from
coal-fired electric-generation plants.

78. See generally Ackemam & Stewart, supra note 20.
79. See Mintz, supranote 21.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Though governmental attempts to allocate scarce environmental
resources in our National Parks are a response to market failures, there is
no guarantee that the regulations created by regulatory agencies will result
in beneficial outcomes to society as a whole. In order for beneficial
outcomes to result, lawmakers and regulators alike must begin to take a
broader and more economically based view of the allocation of these
resources and require that incentive-based approaches be instituted in
future rulemaking. We will find that in many cases, such as the noise
regulation over the GCNP, environmental damages may be mitigated at a
smaller cost to economic agents than when standard command and control
approaches are taken.
We have argued that due to the unique characteristics of the aircraft
impacts on GCNP resources, less uncertainty surrounds the socially
efficient level of noise in the Canyon, making it an ideal testing ground for
incentive-based approaches. However, it remains to be seen whether the
institutional movement toward incentive-based strategies for
environmental protection will actually take place. To date, very few
incentive-based programs are in place in the United States. Currently, sulfur
dioxide emissions from power plants are regulated by an experimental
tradable permits approach.' Prior to the implementation of the tradable
permits, economists estimated that expenditures for electrical generation at
coal-fired electric plants were 47 percent higher than cost-minimizing
levels. " ' Another program allows for tradable permits to improve water
quality.s2 If instituted, a fee-based program to regulate noise in the GCNP
would be the first of its kind and a valuable opportunity for collecting
needed data on incentive-based programs.

80. See FIELD, supranote 5, at 311.
81. See Frank M. Gollop &Markj. Roberts, Cost-MinimizingRegulation of Sulfur Emissions:
Regional Gains in Electric Power,67 REV. ECON. &STAT. 81, 82 (1985).
82. See generally Dana L Hoag & Jennie S. Hughes-Popp, The Theory and Practiceof
PollutionCredit Trading in Water QualityManagement, 19 REv. AGRIC. ECON. 252 (1997).

